“Röhm Putsch”: German business bosses congratulated | nd-aktuell.de

In the early morning of June 30, 1934, Hitler got out of his heavy Mercedes and hurried to the Hanselbauer spa home in Bad Wiessee on Lake Tegernsee. In his entourage: Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels and the Hanoverian SA leader Viktor Lutze as well as a few SS men. The first to be arrested was Ernst Röhm, chief of staff of the SA, who was still in bed. Afterwards, other SA leaders were also affected, all of whom had been ordered there by Hitler to attend a meeting and were now completely surprised to find themselves accused of high treason. Around twenty high-ranking brown shirts are transported to the Munich headquarters of the NSDAP. The so-called Brown House is cordoned off by a Reichswehr company, one of the many examples of the logistical and substantive support of the action against the SA leadership.

At the end of this and the next day – according to later officially announced, but often doubted, information – 90 people were murdered, some shot legally, some from behind or allegedly while trying to escape. Everything is happening without any substantiated charges, without any legal basis, without any possibility of defense in regular courts. Even certain norms of previous remote jurisdiction are waived. Pure fascist terror!

Many Germans had already experienced this in Weimar times. And even more so since January 30, 1933. But now this terror reached a new climax, and a special one, because it was not directed against the anti-fascist resistance as usual. Nazis from his own ranks fell victim to him. Fascists killed fascists! In addition, German national-conservative allies were also affected in the competition over the further design of the new system of rule as well as in the struggle for further steps in armament and preparation for war. In some cases, the situation was shamelessly used to settle old scores. The bloody power struggle took place within the political, military and intellectual elites of the time.

How this happened in detail, who was killed, when and how, has often been described. None of the huge number of Hitler biographies available, none of the many biographies of individual people, no book on the history of the SA, no depiction of the crisis situation in the first half of 1934 can do without a corresponding chapter. In military history publications things sometimes look a little different. Hardly any specific works have been presented, as Peter Longerich (“Accounting. Hitler, Röhm and the murders of June 30, 1934”) and Sven Felix Kellerhoff “‘Röhm Putsch’ 1934. Hitler’s first murder operation”) recently emphatically point out in their overviews, one is more analytical and interpretive, the other prefers his journalistic narrative style. But we agree on the matter: the actual perpetrator is Hitler.

It is worth taking a historiographical look at what was primarily emphasized and what the current representations now focus on. Initial studies on the subject highlighted Hitler’s hesitation in dealing with Röhm and saw Göring, Himmler, Heydrich and the Reichswehr leaders Blomberg and Reichenau as the driving forces of the bloody undertaking. This was particularly pointed out by the GDR historian Kurt Gossweiler, who tried to place the overemphasis on Hitler’s role since the mid-1950s in the West German remilitarization period. He based, among other things, on a statement made by Reichenau after June 30, 1934, that “it really wasn’t that easy to ‘get’ things done on June 30 in such a way that this day presented itself as a ‘pure party affair’.” .

There is no mention of this in the more recent publications (nor from GDR authors). It is striking that there is no reference to Hitler’s meeting with the highest commanders of the Reichswehr and Reichsmarine on February 3, 1933, in which a strategically preparatory course for war was set out: First, democracy should be eliminated and Marxism and pacifism “with a blunt and Stiel”, it is also important to build up a military force based on general conscription and to prepare the people, especially the youth, for new wars. These would then be about the conquest of “living space,” especially in areas in Eastern Europe, and about their “Germanization.” Hitler also thought it appropriate to explain to the generals the future function of the SA and to emphasize that “there is no intention of amalgamating the Army and the SA.”

However, since the end of 1933 and especially in the first half of 1934, it became apparent that this promise could not easily be kept. Until January 30, the SA had contributed to the destruction of the Weimar Republic through terrorist and fearsome means. Now, like other sub-organizations of the NSDAP, it was to be transformed into one of the supporting “pillars” of the state. Their first task now was to work together with the previously fought state apparatus to “cleanse” unwanted forces. The interests of Nazi leaders and the followers they led quickly diverged. The former had reached the top of the state. And even for a relatively small circle, the era of new careers, growing prestige and well-paid positions began. But for others there was no such thing. The new relationship between party and state power brought no advantages for many, hardly any secure jobs or profitable functions.

At the same time, the number of SA members increased rapidly. While there were around 400,000 at the beginning of 1933, the number increased tenfold within a short period of time. The “Stahlhelm – Association of Front Soldiers” were added to the SA. and other paramilitary associations, which in Weimar times had mostly supported the conservative German National People’s Party or the right-wing liberal German People’s Party. At the same time, discontent grew within their ranks over social and political promises that had not been kept. Hundreds of thousands of dissatisfied followers saw themselves left behind and were happy to follow the SA leaders’ demands that the so-called National Socialist revolution must be continued. At the same time, plans began to take shape to develop the SA as a kind of people’s militia. As part of the general rearmament policy, the SA also rearmed its troops militarily. The Reichswehr increasingly feared that it would be pushed out of its military-political monopoly position.

The growing conflict between the party and one of its associated organizations quickly went beyond internal party disputes. Economic problems and the perceived decline in unemployment led to social problems and declining trust in the new state leadership. Not much could be achieved with a campaign against “grouchers” and “complainers”. The regime was increasingly faced with the question of how to most successfully secure power internally and externally in the interests of those in power, especially since concerns arose in conservative, aristocratic and Catholic circles about previous government practices and plans for a continued “revolution”. With the speech by Vice Chancellor Franz von Papen in Marburg on June 17, 1934, reservations about the regime of a one-party system became public. The Nazi fascists saw their goal of securing a stable, reliable mass following that could be mobilized even in difficult times to be at risk.

Above all, the Reichswehr leadership exerted increasing pressure to finally clarify the relationship between itself and the emerging SA as soon as possible. Incidents on site led to mutual accusations and to a large number of internal discussions and agreements, although hardly any of them were kept. Finally, Hitler, Göring, Himmler and Heydrich prepared the decisive blow: the SA was to be beheaded, so to speak, i.e. deprived of its leadership. Secret orders for the deployment of SS troops and members of the secret service headed by Heydrich were carefully and thoroughly prepared. Hitler acted personally in Bavaria, Göring in the Berlin area, Heydrich in Silesia and Saxony. Tens of secret orders were already in front of the actors and were opened and fulfilled at specified times. What remains clear is that the murderous gears worked almost flawlessly. Whatever was ordered was met with a willingness to kill.

So, de facto overnight, in alleged “state self-defense” – Hitler spoke of this on July 13, 1934 in front of the Reichstag, in which no questioning, let alone protesting voice was raised – significant structural and personnel changes had taken place in the power structure of the German fascists. Quick recognition was reflected in countless thanks. The top brass of the Reichswehr, especially Reichswehr Minister Werner von Blomberg, praised Hitler’s actions and even remained silent about those murdered in their own ranks. Hitler also received congratulations from business circles on the success of his “quick action,” which – as the “Deutsche Bergwerkszeitung” wrote – saved the economy. Hardly anyone from the circle of German intellectuals moved. On the other hand, the well-known law professor Carl Schmitt even expressed his willingness to grant the “Führer” supreme judicial power. Hitler was able to prophesy at the Nuremberg party conference: “There will be no more revolution in Germany in the next thousand years.”

The immediate consequences of the bloody murder campaign quickly became apparent. Hitler gained new power, and after Hindenburg’s death, the office of Reich Chancellor was merged with that of Reich President and he became supreme commander of the Wehrmacht. He also saw himself as more prominent in his immediate surroundings, in the crowd of Nazi greats. From now on he stood above the second line of leaders, in which there was no lack of power, competence and rivalry struggles in the following years. He seemed to have become indispensable. Longerich writes that he became a “sole dictator,” not shying away from the questionable nature of such a formulation.

The longer-term consequences of the murders of June 30, 1934 included the opening of the way for increased rearmament, the introduction of compulsory military service and the creation of a mass army. It was also about the implementation of the detailed plans that had already been drawn up by the Reichswehr leadership in the mid-1920s under the title “WH 808” and are hardly mentioned today. These papers explained that in the future a mass army of 2.8 to three million soldiers would be needed, organized into eight armies and 102 divisions. Instead of the 42 generals in the Reichswehr, 252 were planned for the “large” army. And: The field army had exactly this number of budget positions for generals in 1939. The “war strength” planned in 1925 was achieved 14 years later, immediately before the outbreak of the Second World War. In other words: June 30, 1934 was followed by September 1, 1939.