Reason of State – German Sensitivities | nd-aktuell.de

“This historic responsibility of Germany is part of my country’s reason of state,” said Angela Merkel in 2008 in front of the Israeli parliament, the Knesset. “That means that Israel’s security is never negotiable for me as German Chancellor.” At that time, expressed in the context of the Iranian threat with nuclear missiles, the German reason of state with regard to Israel was in the world. After the terrorist attack by Hamas on October 7, 2023, it experienced a boom again and is now a catchphrase with a highly ambivalent meaning: the term served and serves various positions and ranges from reassuring solidarity with Israel to criticizing Germany’s Middle East policy to the guilt cult accusation that raison d’être is only compensation for “German guilt”.

The term “reason of state” is extremely charged, but no one knows what it exactly means. In order to investigate this, the annual conference of the Leipzig Leibniz Institute for Jewish History and Culture – Simon Dubnow was dedicated to the term and the “history of a misunderstanding,” as the title says. In addition to an internal specialist discussion, the conference program on December 4th and 5th included two public evening events that discussed background shifts within global worldviews and put the term raison d’état to the test. It is currently not self-evident that the event on German-Israeli relations took place in Leipzig – and completely without any disruptions. During the week of the conference, a lecture on anti-Semitism at the University of Leipzig was canceled because anti-Israel groups had threatened to protest and storm the building.

Changing worldviews

First of all, raison d’état is a term that in political science contradicts the rule of law: it contains a higher-level reason or instructions for action, while democratically constituted societies – bound by law – would give themselves one. Reasons of state are not applicable to modern statehood. The political scientist Claus Leggewie, among others, pointed this out in his opening lecture “The European-Israeli relationship against the background of global transformations,” which served as a link to the overall conference. In this way, different interpretations of the world arise in modern times, which does not make dealing with the already complicated Middle East conflict any easier.

According to Leggewie, the Middle East conflict is not a simple territorial conflict that, for example, could be solved comparatively easily by dividing territory. Because it is religiously and ideologically charged; This does not only concern the clash between Israeli and Palestinian interests. This makes the conflict tragic, understood in the sense of ancient tragedies: “It’s like Oedipus, whatever Israel does, it becomes even deeper entangled in the tragic.” This leads to a political dilemma in which Germany and Europe are also players involved in tragedy.

The political scientist underlines how much Israel and the Middle East conflict have become a crystallization point within changing worldviews – or better: a changing constellation of competing worldviews. Originally, the Soviet Union was Israel’s partner, which only changed in the 1960s. From then on, the country was perceived as the US twin and spearhead of Western imperialism. Large parts of the Western Left have adopted this anti-imperialist worldview, which was supposedly confirmed by liberation movements such as in Cuba and Vietnam.

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This dynamic gave rise to the Non-Aligned Group of States, which positioned itself outside the East-West front of the Cold War. Those who were pejoratively declared to be part of the “Third World” had become self-confident. “An alliance was formed that explicitly opposed the hegemony of the West,” said Leggewie. According to Leggewie, this ideological frontal position led to the very tragic situation in which anyone who takes a position inevitably finds themselves entangled. Therefore, the states’ own postcolonial demands often cannot be met. Leggewie cited the example of the Western Sahara conflict, where the postcolonial states suddenly acted like colonialists themselves and insisted on the arbitrarily drawn borders of the European occupiers. He quoted decolonization thinker Frantz Fanon’s warning against a “narrow-gauge fascism” of postcolonial regimes.

Reasons of state under scrutiny

The solidarity of Western intellectuals with the “global South,” in which political categories are often transformed into identity categories, is a further overdetermination of the Middle East conflict. Israel is counted as part of the global north and the Palestinian territories as part of the south. According to Leggewie, this ideological position must be taken into account when considering the Middle East conflict and Germany’s relationship with Israel. Because it leads to dangerous projections, such as the one that the Gaza war is about the abolition of capitalism and patriarchy, as can currently be heard at some pro-Palestinian demos.

This projection of salvation also touched on the prominent panel discussion on the second day of the conference, albeit only in passing. The podium of “Reason of State on the Test Stand” was about the key question “How do you feel about reason of state?”, which of course could not be answered definitively. Overall, the discussion was rather positive, and the participants’ perspectives were complementary. Journalist Eren Güvercin spoke primarily as a German Muslim and outlined the challenges of bringing the culture of remembrance of the Shoah to people from families with a migration history. For example, one could point to the expulsion of Jewish people from Muslim countries: “Anti-Semitism also has to do with your origins, it is not just a German thing.”

The journalist Christoph Schult brought a perspective trained in foreign policy, while ex-diplomat Susanne Wasum-Rainer reported from political practice. In this case, the term raison d’état would not have played a role if, for example, she criticized settler policy and human rights violations in Israel. Foreign policy would not have changed from 2008 after Merkel’s speech, and legal binding is not derived from reasons of state anyway. Lawyer and journalist Ronen Steinke, who was disturbed by the current instrumentalization of the term, took the same line: Germans feel obliged to remain silent about Israeli crimes because of feelings of guilt, according to a frequently made accusation by pro-Palestinian activists. This does not correspond to reality, as Steinke also showed using historical examples. Rather, the accusation serves to stabilize one’s own worldview and self-assurance.

Not a Jewish problem

The discussants contradicted the impression or even the accusation that Germany was behaving more cautiously towards Israel due to Merkel’s imperative of raison d’état. However, they criticized some of the formulaic language used by German politicians and the diplomatic hesitation, for example when it came to the arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Galant. Of course these would be implemented, explained Ronen Steinke, “Germany has signed a contract.” And international jurisdiction is a hard-won achievement. In addition, panelist Christoph Schult interjected, given the arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin, German policy reaffirmed its immediate execution should the Russian president set foot on German soil.

During the discussion there was a warning that the raison d’état was being used to restrict freedom of assembly. Everyone on the podium condemned the instrumentalization of anti-Semitism. One should also not play the game of pitting Muslim anti-Semitism (“imported”) against neo-Nazi or left-wing anti-Semitism – especially since it is also widespread in the hard-working middle of society. “The fight against anti-Semitism is not a Jewish problem, but a necessary part of democratic culture,” said Eren Güvercin.

Many Germans’ activist reference to Palestine is more of a fetish, the audience said during the final general discussion. Claus Leggewie’s reference to entrenched identitarian worldviews returned here. Strange alliances arise from these fetishized front positions, for example when K groups demonstrate with Islamists. Overall, the discussion warned of an increasing lack of empathy, as well as the narrowing of discourse spaces, such as the event at the University of Leipzig that was canceled due to a threat.

The fact that the keffiyeh has become a political fashion statement over the last year, while wearing a kippah has become even more dangerous, has become a German present – and also reflects the debate within Germany. This is often done in purely self-referential terms, according to the criticism on the podium. Of course, the discourse in this country does not help anyone against rocket fire from Hamas and Hezbollah, does not free hostages and does not end the Israeli military operation or the suffering and death of the people in Gaza. Those acting, proclaiming and agitating in Germany seem like the choir in the tragedy – to stay with Claus Leggewie’s image – who comments, moralizes, but neither can nor wants to intervene. The moderator Gisela Dachs, who lives in Israel, found a fitting final word on this point: “If you want to change something about the situation there, which is dramatic for both sides, then it can’t be about your own sensitivities in Germany.”

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