Ms. Johne, what do you mean by the “unconscious conscious” when you talk about the continuities of fascism?
We psychoanalysts deal intensively with the unconscious because it has a strong influence on how we think, feel and act. This is shaped by upbringing, environmental influences and social conditions. I examine how social conditions and inner psychological processes contribute to transgenerational trauma and are reflected in current political attitudes.
Who are the “Wendekinder” and how does the Nazi past shape their family legacy?
Psychoanalytically speaking, children of Nazi perpetrators were often used to protect their parents from questions about what they did during the Nazi era. This is proven by numerous patient stories. In many families, perpetration was passed on transgenerationally to the second and third generations. This generation, which was born after the Second World War and had parents from the Nazi era, was the parent generation at the time of reunification. Wendekinder are those who were born in the GDR between the mid-70s and mid-80s. They spent part of their childhood in the GDR, were confronted with the SED’s educational methods and then experienced the change in the middle of their childhood and youth. Suddenly completely different standards of value applied at home and at school.
Interview
Maria Johne is a qualified psychologist and, as a psychoanalyst, a member of the German Psychoanalytic Association (DPV) and the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA). From 2017 to 2019 she was chairwoman of the DPV, and since 2021 she has been chairwoman of the DPV Foundation. She focuses on the psychological effects of German history – from the Nazi era to the fall of the Wall – on “reunification children” and current generations in East Germany.
Were there always clear differences in how Nazi crimes were dealt with in East and West Germany?
At first things were similar in East and West Germany: the crimes were suppressed and kept quiet and not acknowledged. According to Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, this repression ultimately went beyond mere forgetting or denial among the Nazi perpetrators. An inner psychic “crypt” was formed in which the crimes and the emotions associated with them were locked away. No one was allowed to touch this inner crypt. This prevented many Germans from taking personal responsibility for their involvement in Nazi crimes.
Why is it important to look at East Germany in particular?
I’m focusing on East Germany because that’s where I grew up. After the end of National Socialism and the lost war, two separate German states emerged through the Four Power Agreement. A dictatorship developed in the Soviet occupied zone, shaped by the Stalinism of the early 1950s. Initially, former NSDAP members were forbidden from joining the SED, but soon 15 percent of SED members were former NSDAP members. They adapted to the new power structures to compensate for their loss and the narcissistic injury after the war. The myth arose that the GDR was not to blame because it was no longer a capitalist state. This prevented anyone from taking personal responsibility, even though there were Nazis there too – as in many German families. There were tragic consequences at the family level, as personal acceptance of responsibility for crimes committed was only possible to a very limited extent. In West Germany, however, the ’68 movement led to children asking their parents: “What did you do during National Socialism?” Acceptance of guilt, reparations and the necessary mourning process did not take place in the same way in East Germany. This would have been important on a personal and family level, as the narcissistic injury to the German population caused by the lost war and the loss of their idol Adolf Hitler left deep scars.
How did the reunification shape the identity of the children of the reunification?
The fall of the Wall resulted in a second narcissistic injury in East Germany: many former GDR citizens lost their jobs and the identity they had built in the GDR. Parents were often unable to offer their children a stable framework because they themselves were busy dealing with the major upheavals of the 1990s. This insult led to disorientation and radicalization among some young people of the transition generation. Right-wing movements were particularly attractive to them. As Adorno aptly said, National Socialism is not gone, but lives on in authoritarian characters.
How does the authoritarian character live on?
It was often passed on transgenerationally through upbringing. After reunification, it became clear that Nazis existed in both East Germany and West Germany, and the question about the Nazi legacy arose again: Was it only superficial remembering or had there also been an inner psychological coming to terms with it?
What role do feelings of guilt about the Nazi past play in this political attitude?
The failure to recognize the guilt of the Nazi perpetrators led to their children’s strong defense against guilt: the perpetrators avoided confronting the Nazi past within their families and passed on their feelings of guilt to the next generation. Children unconsciously prevented their parents from dealing with their guilt – but suffered from it themselves. The recognition of collective guilt would have been the right way, but defense against guilt was strong until the 1990s – especially in East Germany. The third generation took different paths, often characterized by a deep sense of shame when, for example, Germans abroad were viewed askance because of their Nazi past. Her grandparents’ generation was often still alive in the 90s and sometimes consciously supported their grandchildren’s activities in right-wing extremist groups. The old hurt over the collapse of National Socialism and the desire for this “greater” Germany could be revived in right-wing radical groups. This ideology, visible to this day in AfD propaganda, is once again spreading into the middle of society: Germany should once again produce “superior masters” who are supposedly better than migrants. This is a great danger to democracy.
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How do you explain the rise of the AfD?
The differences, especially in terms of material resources and social advancement opportunities, are still large between East and West. East Germans have fewer opportunities for advancement. Many members of the East German elite, as well as significantly more women, emigrated after the fall of the Wall, which left a strong demographic imbalance. Less well-educated men were often left behind, especially in rural areas, a high proportion of whom now vote for the AfD. The party offers simple answers to complex questions. These men also come together in right-wing groups because a traditional – albeit outdated – image of men is propagated there.
Why are young people in the East currently becoming radicalized?
There is deep dissatisfaction in East Germany that is not economically based. It is often claimed that the government does not care about East Germans and treats them as second-class citizens. This is often passed down through families. At the same time, people in the GDR lived in a closed society in which there were hardly any points of contact with people from other cultures – although they were there, just largely segregated. There is also the illusion that migrants receive more support than East Germans. In addition, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and hatred of Jews from the Nazi era have become more entrenched within many families over the decades.
How do projections reinforce racist and anti-Semitic attitudes?
Anything you don’t succeed in can be projected onto other groups who appear undesirable. Traditional resentments reinforce this attitude, especially towards people who are marked as foreign. This quickly leads to the attitude, “They are taking something away from you,” without actual contact with these people. In populist movements, resentment has a stronger effect than projections, often coupled with envy and the frustration of the older generation. Interestingly, many young people in the East define themselves as “East Germans” even though they were neither born in the GDR nor does this country even exist. Nevertheless, there is a strong sense of identity passed down through the family.
What is the status of the culture of remembrance in Germany?
Although there is sometimes a good coming to terms with the past, especially in historical and artistic areas, an illusion of superiority arose in Germany that the Nazi guilt had been completely dealt with. In Saxony, for example, people believed in the 1990s that they were immune to right-wing radicalism, which in turn led to a lack of social engagement with Nazi continuities. However, racist pogroms and cases like the NSU murders show that this is not the case. In addition, a serious examination of the GDR’s past is required in order to understand the transgenerational transmission of resentment in the East.
“Assumption of guilt, reparations and the necessary mourning process did not really take place in the GDR.”
Maria Johne Graduate psychologist