Extreme right – AfD and the media: The beloved enemy

Teresa Völker, in the state elections in Thuringia a few days ago, the AfD, a right-wing extremist party that has been confirmed by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, became the strongest force. You conducted a study on the topic of “media and the extreme right”. Which results were particularly striking or surprising for you?

What I found particularly striking was the observation that the AfD was able to gain sovereignty in the media very early on. Way before she was elected to parliament.

From then on, the media had to definitely report on the AfD because it became part of the party political landscape.

Correct. The statement that the AfD only received space in the media discourse when it was in parliament contradicts my findings. Since its founding, the AfD has enjoyed a great deal of visibility, resonance and therefore legitimacy in the media. Their narratives were taken up particularly after critical events, such as the so-called refugee crisis in 2015 or the terrorist attacks in 2015/16. In this way, she was able to quickly offer interpretations – in the context of cultural debates, such as migration or Islam, but also in security issues. These positions were then taken up by other actors. A trend that continues to this day.

So you’re saying that the media made the AfD big?

Of course, the rise of the radical right has many factors. However, I would deduce from the results that the media played a central role.

For us journalists, however, it is now important to write what is. Back then, one could not ignore the fact that a force was emerging in the pre-parliamentary space that had voter potential. The right-wing extremist tendencies of the AfD were reported extremely critically.

What is particularly important is visibility and not just the type of reporting. Whether a contribution is critical or not often has little impact on the result. When a party and its political demands receive so much public attention, it benefits from it. I would also say that the AfD’s radicalization potential was initially underestimated by many, including media professionals. There has been too little reflection on the fact that when you depict reality, you also create reality. This includes the failure to introduce alternative ideas into the discourse – both on the part of the democratic parties and on the part of the media. Everyone is working far too hard on the question: What did the AfD say? This also happened again in the current state election campaign.

What advice would you give to media professionals?

Away from the fixation on the AfD. Away from exacerbations. There is an obligation to report on all elected parties, yes! But does this duty exist consistently and at every moment? My point is: How and when do I talk about a party? What context do I give? It’s also quite banal: you should always ask yourself what the consequences of reporting are.

Example ZDF summer interviews: Alice Weidel is interviewed as AfD party leader, the fact check that refutes her statements only takes place later on the website…

… where almost no one is interested or reached anymore. My study also found that there are major institutional constraints that media professionals suffer from: time pressure, scarcity of resources, excessive demands. Everything has to happen faster and faster, which means that care is being compromised. There are also risks for journalists. In particular, the public media, which see themselves as objective reporters and take all political opinions into account, were marked as “enemies” by the AfD. Interviewees report attempts at intimidation and attacks.

In this context, the sociologist Wilhelm Heitmeyer speaks of threat alliances. Some agitate verbally, others attack physically. Such situations certainly have consequences.

I sometimes noticed a kind of anticipatory obedience. Almost everyone interviewed said: We no longer jump over every stick. Anyone who looks at the reporting on this election has noticed: they mostly do it. But you don’t have to depict the party and its political demands so strongly in order to get ahead of the criticism and be perceived as one-sided.

Is there a consensus among media professionals about which positions the AfD should be classified as right-wing extremist, i.e. anti-constitutional? Demanding a different asylum policy is not inherently unconstitutional, but calling for laws that virtually abolish the right to asylum is definitely so.

I notice that in Germany, in contrast to other countries, there is not as much trust in science when it comes to such definitional questions. The guidelines here tend to be the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the courts, whose judgments usually only come after a certain time delay. Nevertheless, the fact that the AfD was classified as right-wing extremist by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in some federal states has helped many media professionals to describe them as such. Looking back, the wording has changed noticeably. Which of course also has to do with the fact that the party has changed and become radicalized.

Were there regional differences in the responses of media professionals depending on AfD voter potential?

Everyone had the perception that the AfD was seen as potentially threatening democracy. The challenges are sometimes different, for example depending on the resources: Do you have an editorial team or a media company behind you? A legal department? A security service? Differences can also be seen between anonymous urban contexts and rural ones, where everyone knows you.

In the run-up to the elections in Thuringia, the constitution blog looked at the question of what would happen if the AfD gained state power. For example, the Thuringian state constitution makes it possible to terminate the state media treaty with a simple signature from the Prime Minister. This would mean that the MDR would be dissolved as a broadcasting company. How do media professionals in Thuringia react to this scenario?

It causes some worry and fear, but I haven’t noticed any tendencies of withdrawal. Rather, great emphasis is placed on not making oneself vulnerable, which, as I said, could lead to the difficulties already described in overemphasizing reporting on the AfD. In any case, it is a threat scenario if election posters advertise the abolition of the ÖRR. A confusing situation: As a media professional you want to deal objectively with all elected parties, but one party clearly marks you as an enemy.

The discussion about the ÖRR has repeatedly been fueled by scandal reports from the management levels, where lavish salaries often flow. The debate therefore also has to do with questions of distribution and justice. In addition, despite all the ÖRR’s diversity of perspectives, many people do not feel appealed to by the offer and still have to pay for it. Was error culture a topic in your study?

There is definitely a culture of error. For example, some said that reporting during the corona pandemic was too one-sided. Nevertheless, I would also say here: There must be knowledge of the moment when positions become unconstitutional. The media have the task of enabling discourse, but within the democratic spectrum. Apart from that, most of the ÖRR media professionals I spoke to believe that a balanced debate about the content and design of the ÖRR is absolutely legitimate. The problem is how the discourse is carried out by the AfD and other extremist forces. Keyword elite, lying press etc. It’s not about content, but the ÖRR as a whole is being delegitimized. The legitimate criticism is overshadowed by a populist one.

Some want to improve the system, others want to abolish it. What will follow from your study?

After evaluating all the results, I would like to formulate best practice examples in order to initiate learning effects, ideally with a view to the federal election.