Since November 1945, the sculpture of a Red Armymist created by the artists Lew Kerbel and Vladimir Zigal on the Seelow’s ridge is reminiscent of the Soviet victims.
Photo: Imago/Camera4
At the end of March 1945, the leadership of the Soviet Union achieved credible information that the western Allies had by no means intended to take the intention of having to hold on to the western bank of the Elbe, as agreed in Jalta a few weeks earlier. The British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, according to the Soviet secret services reports, wanted to reach Berlin in front of the Red Army and the Soviet Union to bring its greatest triumph in the Great Patriotic War. If the floor troops do not progress quickly enough, the British Berlin would occupy paratroopers.
The original plans of the Stawka, the headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Red Army to bring the Berlin operation already in preparation in the second half of May in preparation. At the beginning of April, Josef Stalin therefore called the highest ranking military, including Marshal Georgi Schukow, the commander of the 1st Belorous Front, to an urgent meeting in Moscow. As a result, it was decided to start the Berlin operation on April 16. Three fronts, the 1st and 2nd Belorusian and the 1st Ukrainian front, with 2.5 million soldiers, 6250 tanks, 42,000 guns and grenade throwers and 7500 aircraft should compete on the German capital.
The 1st Belorusian front fell the task of leading the main kick in the west, while the 1st Ukrainian front of the south and southwest and the 2nd Belorous front – with a few days of delay – should attack from north and northwest to conclude Berlin from all sides. At that time, the German side still had around one million soldiers, 1,500 tanks and 3,300 aircraft, but it was increasingly lacking ammunition and fuel.
The starting point of the Berlin Operation of the 1st Belorous Front was a bridge head in the area of Küstrin (today Kostrzyn Nad Odrą), which conquered and even defended and even expanded despite violent German attacks in the course of the Vistula or operation. At the same time, along the or numerous ferries and dozens of makeshift bridges, had been sufficiently number to bring troops and equipment to the west bank of the river at the beginning of the Berlin operation.
Despite the great superiority of the Soviet troops of humans and materials, the advance of the 1st Belorous Front did not develop as planned. The attack started in the early morning hours of April 16. At exactly 3 a.m. German time, in Moscow it was already 5 a.m., thousands of large -caliber guns opened the fire. Within two hours, 1.2 million grenades – more than 98,000 tons of steel – went down to the German positions.
However, the strong German troops had been withdrawn from the first line of defense, so that where the focus of the Soviet artillery preparation was, only inexperienced forces – often hardly any armed members of the Volkssturm and the Hitler Youth – should keep up. The German losses were therefore significantly lower than calculated by the Soviet military.
The idea of illuminating the battlefield with 120 anti -aircraft headlights also proved to be counterproductive. As expected, the opponent was blinded and thereby hindered in his actions, but the attacking Soviet troops were also confused by the unexpected glaring light.
Above all, however, Schukow and his employees underestimated the geographical factor – the Seelower heights that extend over several kilometers from north to south, formed a natural defense wall with a height of up to 60 meters. The steep slopes and the height allowed the German troops to effectively combat the German troops in their well -developed positions, the advancing Soviet units, which had to overcome the level and, above all, moral terrain of the Oderbruch without any cover. Inevitably, the attack of the Soviet troops came to a standstill in the course of April 16.
Stalin, who was regularly and in detail about the progress of the fights, called for Schukow to continue the advance as soon as possible. And the marshal was willing to literally fulfill this instruction from the highest commander at all costs: In the fighting for the Seelower heights, thousands of Soviet soldiers once again lost their life, who may have survived the last days of war when the fights were given.
Schukow himself admitted in his “Memories and Thoughts” published in 1974 that it would have been possible and sensible to plan and carry out the Berlin operation differently. The separation line between the 1st Belorusian and the 1st Ukrainian front, according to Schukow almost three decades after the events, should have run from Frankfurt an der Oder and Fürstenberg to the Berlin city center. Schukow did not mention the Seelower heights and the consequent mistakes that were made under his responsibility.
The fact remains: The battle for the Seelower Höhen ended in the early morning hours of April 18 with a victory of the Red Army. The way to Berlin was now free. Already on April 20, Soviet troops reached the immediate suburbs of Berlin. Just in time for Hitler’s last birthday, the bombardment of the government district, the last refuge of the finally failed “leader”, began with an ordinary field artillery. Previous guns were no longer necessary. The following day, on April 21, the 5th shock army led by Colonel Nikolai Bersarin at Marzahn broke the city limits of Berlin. On May 2, 1945, the last German troops in the destroyed imperial capital surrendered. The red flag blew above the Reichstag.
Our author is a historian and member of the speech council of the Historical Commission of the Party DIE LINKE.
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